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Abstract
This paper studies the role of transfers among groups within a country as
well as among countries in a two level game of international trade negotiations.
We show that in order to realize the intended transfer in the presence of asymmetric information on the states of recipients (and donors), a transfer process
uses up additional resources. The diﬃculty of making transfers renders it less
likely that a nation would find it individually rational to participate as a member of an international institution. Costly transfers render the internal and
international adjustment diﬃcult, and serve as a barrier to trade liberalization.
Costly international transfers harden the resistance against trade liberalization
in the (potentially) recipient country and soften it in the (potentially) donor
country.

The theory of common agency (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986) has been successfully applied to analysis of government policies (e.g., Dixit, Grossman and Helpman,
1997) and policy choice of the “euro” currency community (Dixit 2001). Under apparently reasonable assumptions of individual rationality, free transfers and incentive
compatibility, the agency serves the objective of principals eﬃciently. A government,
as an agent, will promote the welfare of its interest groups, and the European Central
Bank (ECB) will serve its member countries. In most of the applications, it is simply
assumed that the transfer payments among principals, as well as between a principal
and the agent can be made without cost.
∗
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If this common agency approach is to be extended to international institutions
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (IBRD), the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO)
as the agents of nations; such institutions should be expected to serve the international community through production of public goods. In fact, the WTO faced an
impasse at Cancun, and the Kyoto Protocol still faces many hurdles, including the
United States’ reluctance to ratify it. We suggest that this gap between theory and
the performance of international organizations is due to insuﬃcient attention to the
economics of transfers in the world economy, as well as within domestic economies.
We propose a simple framework that explains why transfer payments involve additional cost under asymmetric information. We illustrate the importance of transfers
as well as the incidence of diﬃculty in transfers in a simple two-level model of trade
conflict (Putnam, 1988) involving interest groups, governments, and an international
institution. In the model, the governments are agents for domestic pressure groups,
and the international institution is a common agent for nations. The diﬃculty of making transfer payments raises questions about a potential principal in an international
common agency, satisfying its participation (i.e., individual rationality) constraint.
We believe the participation constraint can only be satisfied if the side payment is
determinable.
Coate and Morris (1995), and Dixit and Londregan (1995) demonstrate that political, social and economic costs reduce the frequency of direct transfers. Transfers
take more subtle, and therefore more costly forms. For example, outright transfers
are suspect for not being clearly distinguishable from bribes, inducing both politicians
and voters to prefer more indirect forms of transfers, such as projects and festivities.
Lump-sum transfers to compensate for the loss of welfare arising from policy changes
will involve additional costs for informational and political reasons. By concentrating
on the asymmetry of information between the donors and the recipients of transfers,
we construct a simple theoretical framework to show that transfer payments by a
government or international organization are costly. When the government does not
know exactly how much each constituent loses or how much each constituent gains
from a policy action, the government is obliged to over-compensate or under-tax the
entire group of constituents in order to maintain its political support. What is politically feasible for the principals often violates the budget constraint of the common
agent, rendering liberalization proposals economically infeasible.
The profession is well aware of the importance of transfer payments but is still
short of exploring the full implications of the ease or the diﬃculty of implementing
them. While Dixit and Londregan (1995) explore the political economy of transfers,
Dixit (1997) sets the problem aside as he proceeds to conventional optimization and
distribution analysis in a transfer cost-free environment:
The (payment) merely acts to transfer income between the parties, for
example to make sure that the agent gets enough utility to make it worth
2

his while to participate in this activity. The interests of all parties are
best served by...(maximizing) the total surplus (Appendix, p. 160).
The quoted remark follows the tradition of identifying optimal production and
assuming away the problem of redistribution (c.f. Kemp and Pezanis-Christou, 1999)
The following final remark of Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997) suggests a new
question of comparing the economists’ ideal solution of nondistortionary allocation
and realistic political equilibrium.
It is conceivable that on balance the organized interests fare better in the
latter (i.e., price distorted – authors) regime, so they would unanimously
endorse a constitutional rule restricting the government to ineﬃcient redistributive policies. Thus our model suggests a new way by which distorting
policies might emerge as a political equilibrium (reprinted in Grossman
and Helpman 2002, pp. 41-42).
We hope that the approach we propose in this paper is a step to clarify several
transfer issues along the lines they suggest. In Section 2, we present a two-country
framework where each country has a decision instrument of tariﬀ on imports. We
simplify Putnam’s (1988) two-level game into its bare essentials in order to highlight
the basic nature of transfers. We first ask the conventional question: what can a
common agency (in this case of many nations and an international agency) achieve
if international transfers of income as well as domestic transfers can be made free of
cost. We then explore the consequences of international or domestic, or both of these
types of transfers being blocked for various reasons.
In Section 3, we provide a simple and robust basis for transfers rooted in informational asymmetry. If the government does not know the losses and gains to
individual agents in the sector aﬀected by trade liberalization, any lump sum tax and
subsidy policy to redistribute income will generate dead weight costs. International
transfers carry the same diﬃculty if the international agency does not have the knowledge about the gains and losses accruing to each nation. The nature of additional
costs is like the inevitable additional cost of insurance in the presence of information
asymmetry. Informational factors are partially treated, among many other factors,
by Dixit and Londregan (1995); but we construct a clear-cut theoretical framework
by focusing on a simple but everpresent informational asymmetry that renders the
nature of diﬃculties in making transfers quite transparent.
In Section 4, we return to our two-level game structure and ask what happens
to the common agency solutions if transfers among nations and/or transfers within
a nation are costly. We assume that a part of transfer payments is lost during the
process of transfer as the analysis of Section 3 suggests. Following the famous “iceberg” assumption of international trade theory, we assume that a fraction of transfer
payments evaporates during the process. As this fraction rises, the results approach
those derived in Section 2 where the transfers are completely blocked. Even lower
3

transfer costs mitigate the moves towards trade liberalization by national governments
and the eﬀectiveness of intervention by international agencies.

1

A Simple Model of Mutual Tariﬀ Determination

Consider an international negotiation on tariﬀ rates between two countries. An import tariﬀ is the only instrument each country has. Partial equilibrium analysis in
this setting highlights fundamental features of international economic issues and the
role of transfers in trade talks and conflicts.
Let one of the two be a developing country (Country 1) and the other an industrialized country (Country 2). The developing country exports agricultural good A, and
the industrialized country exports manufactured good M. The industrialized country
imposes tariﬀ ta on good A, and the developing country imposes tariﬀ tm on good M.
Export subsidies are excluded for either good. The bliss levels of the tariﬀs are a for
the agricultural good in the industrialized country and m for the manufactured good
in the developing country. Note that the choice of tm is the only strategy for the
developing Country 1, and the choice of ta is the only strategy for the industrialized
Country 2. For simplicity, the economic scales of these countries are assumed to be
similar. Figure 1 shows the configuration of the world economy.
The governments of these countries minimize the sum of the losses, relative to
the bliss point borne by their two productive sectors. Consumers being individually
too small to influence the government, their welfare is not considered for now (this
assumption is relaxed later). The national loss function for Country 1 consists of
the loss to its manufacturing sector due to imports, and the loss to its agricultural
sector arising from the Country 2 tariﬀ on the agricultural good. In other words,
the first term represents the damage to the manufacturing sector when the tariﬀ
deviates from the optimal level m, and the second term represents the damage to the
agricultural sector when the tariﬀ in Country 2 deviates from zero. Let us call the
generic international organization of our model the International Trade Organization
(ITO).1 The benefits of joining the ITO, or of joining the club by itself, is ignored.
Formally, the loss to Country 1 is written as follows2 :
L1 = γ 11 (tm − m)2 + γ 12 t2a ,

(1)

where γ’s are the positive weights of the losses to the two sectors.
Similarly, the objective function of the industrialized Country 2, is expressed as
the sum of the loss of its manufacturing sector due to the tariﬀ in Country 1 and the
loss of its agricultural sector due to the deviation of the tariﬀ on agricultural good
1

We use the label ITO to distinguish it from the actual WTO. Needless to say, ITO is the
organization that was supposed to have been born with the GATT but didn’t.
2
Krugman and Obstfeld (2003, Appendix to Chapter 9) suggest that the welfare loss is expressed
by a quadratic form.
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from the most desired level a:
L2 = γ 21 t2m + γ 22 (ta − a)2 .

(2)

In the simpler case where γ 11 = γ 22 = 1,and γ 12 = γ 21 = γ( 0) :
L1 = (tm − m)2 + γt2a ,
L2 = γt2m + (ta − a)2 .

(3)
(4)

In the absence of ITO, Country 1, would want to make tm equal to m, and wants
the Country 2 tariﬀ on the agricultural good to be zero. The latter is beyond the
control of Country 1. Similarly, Country 2 would want to make ta equal to a, and
prefer that the tariﬀ rate of Country 1 on the manufactured good is equal to zero.
The non-cooperative behavior of the governments yields the Nash equilibrium with
the tax instruments taking values tm = m and ta = a, and the total loss to the world
economy is γ(m2 + a2 ).
The possibility of reducing this loss creates an opportunity for a global trade organization to perform an agency role. Grossman and Helpman (1995) discuss the situation where an international institution works ‘as if’ it were a common agency. They
state: “While there is no identifiable common agent, the objective function...can be
regarded as being that of ‘as if’ mediator or a surrogate world government” (reprinted
in Grossman and Helpman (2002), p. 161).
We take this analogy a step further and consider an international institution as
a common agency. One of the reasons Grossman and Helpman do not treat an international trade organization as a common agency may be that substantial transfer
payments across countries are diﬃcult to make. Since Dixit (2001) treats the European Central Bank as a common agency, it is only a short step to treat other
international organizations as a common agency. (See Hamada, 1998, for such an attempt.) We assume that the international economic organization actually functions
as a common agency. Both countries oﬀer incentive schedules to induce the ITO to set
desirable bounds for tariﬀ levels to minimize the sum of losses for the two countries.
In this section, we abstract from the question of incentive compatibility, that is, the
incentive to tell the truth in order to focus on the role of transfers; the two countries
are assumed to reveal honestly the marginal benefit and cost of the ITO decision.
Let us suppose that the ITO sets the maximum levels of tariﬀs for the two goods at
Tm and Ta , constraining feasible tariﬀ levels to tm ≤ Tm and ta ≤ Ta . The industrial
sector of Country 1 would prefer that tm be set equal to Tm , and ta set by Country
2 be zero. Similarly, the agricultural sector of Country 2 prefers ta be set to Ta and
the tariﬀ rate of Country 1 on manufactured good be zero.
Even though our main purpose is to introduce costly transfers into the model, we
start from the conventional assumption of costless transfers between nations. Suppose
the ITO is the common agency of the two countries along the standard analysis by
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Dixit-Grossman—Helpman (1997). Country 1
5

signals its intention by oﬀering a schedule −L1 +Const. = −[(tm −m)2 +γt2a ] +Const.
Similarly, Country 2 signals its intention by oﬀering a schedule −L2 + Const. =
−[(ta − a)2 + γt2m ] +Const. Then, the ITO will set the maximal allowable level of
tariﬀs Tm and Ta by minimizing the cost.
k

l

L1 + L2 = [(Tm − m)2 + γTa2 ] + γTm2 + (Ta − a)2 .

(5)

We may call it the ’Benthamite’ solution by the international agency. Under the
assumption of costless transfers, countries do not need to worry about the participation constraints because costless transfers will always generate a situation where
individual rationality is satisfied, and the ITO will not break down. Therefore, they
will set the tariﬀ levels at permissible maximums, tm = Tm and ta = Ta . The optimal
tariﬀ levels for the ITO are
Tm = m/(1 + γ), and Ta = a/(1 + γ).

(6)

Country 1, which used to incur the loss of L01 = γa2 , will now incur the loss
L1 =

γ
(γm2 + a2 ).
(γ + 1)2

(7)

Country 2, which used to incur the loss of L02 = γm2 will now incur the loss of
L2 =

γ
(m2 + γa2 ).
(γ + 1)2

(8)

γ
)(m2 + a2 ) by the ITO
The total world loss would be reduced from γ(m2 + a2 ) to ( 1+γ
decision.
For the above solution to be a genuine common agency solution for participants
who are willing to join, it must also satisfy the individual rationality constraint or the
participation constraint for each country. For Country 1, the loss must be reduced
unless transfer payments are made from Country 2:

L01 − L1 = γa2 −

k
l
γ
γ2
2
2
2
2
(γm
+
a
)
=
(γ
+
2)a
−
m
≥0
(γ + 1)2
(γ + 1)2

(9)

This inequality does not necessarily hold, however. If m, the initial optimal value, is
suﬃciently large, it is violated. Unless large enough transfers are made, Country 1 will
lose by joining the ITO and complying with its decision unless it receives suﬃciently
large compensating transfers.
By the same token, the individual rationality constraint for Country 2 is violated
if a is suﬃciently larger than m .
L02 − L2 = γm2 −

k
l
γ
γ2
2
2
2
2
(m
+
γa
)
=
(2
+
γ)m
−
a
≥0
(γ + 1)2
(γ + 1)2
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(10)

Figure 2A illustrates the case when both conditions (9) and (10) are satisfied, and
Figures 2B and 2C show the case where either (9) or (10) is violated respectively.
That is, if the degree of agricultural protection is much larger in Country 2, Country
2 will lose by following the decision of the ITO. Needless to say, one or the other
or both countries will gain; but both cannot lose simultaneously from ITO’s optimal
decision.
Let us consider the case when Country 1 loses by joining the club. When L01 − L1 ,
it is diﬃcult for the ITO to function as a mediator, or as a common agent, unless the
transfer payment Y ≥ L1 − L01 is paid from Country 2 to 1. Whenever one country
loses, some transfer payments would be required for the ITO to improve the welfare
of the world.
If transfers are costless as usually assumed, the participation constraint does not
raise any problem because transfers can compensate the losing party as long as there
is any gain from cooperation. If we relax the assumption that governments neglect the
welfare of consumers, the objective function of the ITO should include an additional
term representing the benefit to consumers. Assume that consumers’ surplus is fully
counted in both the countries and transfers are costless. In the partial equilibrium
setting, when we net out gains and losses related to tariﬀ revenues, the total loss
to the world economy is the sum of Harberger’s triangles representing the distortion
caused by the tariﬀs (the sum of shaded areas for agricultural product in Figure 3).
In this linear case, it is obvious that the sum of the area of triangles is proportional to
the square of tariﬀ rate tm . Similarly, the sum of the social loss due to the agricultural
tariﬀ is proportional to the square of tariﬀ rate ta .
Since the loss triangles are quadratic functions of tm and ta , the world trade loss
will be expressed as
Γ = µ1 t2m + µ2 t2a = µ1 Tm2 + µ2 Ta2 ,
(11)
where µ1 and µ2 are positive. Thus the free trade (Tm = Ta = 0) will achieve the
optimal situation loss, Γ = 0. (These tariﬀ levels will be obtained when the ITO takes
full account of the world consumers’ welfare even though each country does not take
account of their own consumers’ welfare.) We state the summary of this paragraph
as Proposition I (at least anticipated by Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman 1997):
Proposition I: If an International Institution (ITO) acts as a Benthamite common
agency under the assumption of free transfers, the outcome will be Pareto eﬃcient
for the two governments as well as for economic interests groups in the world. If the
governments of both countries represent the interest of consumers as well as producers,
then under the assumption of free transfer, an international agency will achieve a
Pareto optimal situation for the citizens of the world.
Even with full representation of consumer interest, introduction of the cost of
transfer and participation constraints make it diﬃcult to achieve free trade.

7

1.1

Blocked international transfers

Let us consider the polar case where international transfers are impossible. Given
the infrequency of such transfers, this assumption is not unreasonable. We return
to the assumption that only the interests of the pressure groups (agriculture and
manufacture in our example), are considered, and the interests of consumers are
ignored.
If the value of m/a stays in a narrow band around unity so that
m t
2+γ >
(12)
> 1/(2 + γ)
a
holds, the ITO’s Benthamite program to minimize the sum of the world loss is within
the region where no international transfers are needed. Therefore, the cost of transfers
does not interfere with the functioning of the common agency and the Benthamite
solution will prevail.
t
If the value of m/a is outside (12), namely m
>
(2 + γ) , then the ITO is obliged
a
to minimize
t

L1 + L2 = [(Tm − m)2 + γTa2 ] + [γTm2 + (Ta − a)2 ],

(13)

subject to the constraint that Country 1 is not compensated by transfers. (The
other constraint for Country 2, is automatically satisfied with strict inequality.) This
situation is illustrated by Figure 2B:
L01 − L1 = γa2 − [(Tm − m)2 + γTa 2 ] ≤ 0.

(14)

We introduce the Kuhn-Tucker form and a multiplier µ.
L = [(Tm − m)2 + γTa2 ] + [γTm2 + (Ta − a)2 ] + µ{[(Tm − m)2 + γTa 2 ] − γa2 }, (15)
and obtain the first order conditions
Tm =

1+µ
1
m, and Ta =
a.
1+γ+µ
1 + γ + µγ

(16)

Comparing equation (6) with (16), and taking account of the mutual slack condition that multiplier µ is nonnegative when the transfer constraint (15) is binding, we
can conclude that if the international transfers are blocked the tariﬀ rate in Country
1 is higher than the case when it is free. The tariﬀ rate in Country 2 is lower than
the case of free transfer.
t
We can do the same exercise when m
<
1/(2 + γ) and summarize the results as
a
Proposition II:
When international transfers are blocked, and the ratio of a and m is far enough
from unity, the ITO will stop short of minimizing the joint loss. The limit for the tariﬀ
8

rate of the commodity imported by the country for which the participation constraint is
binding will be higher than the level without transfer restrictions.The limit for the tariﬀ
rate of the commodity imported by the country for which the participation constraint is
not binding will be lower than the level without transfer restrictions across countries.
Incidentally, we can draw the contract curve for Country 1 and Country 2. By
equating the marginal rate of substitution
tm − m
γtm
=
.
γta
ta − a
Thus the contract curve is an hyperbola that is downward sloping in general, and
concave to the origin if 0 < γ < 1:
(tm − m)(ta − a) = γ 2 tm ta

(17)

Under the situation, tm is equated to Tm and ta to Ta . The reader can easily verify
that (16) satisfies (17). Therefore, a point like D in Figure 2B, the intersection of the
individual-rationality curve and the contract curve will be chosen.

1.2

Domestic transfers between sectors blocked

If the domestic transfers between sectors are blocked, the manufacturing sector of a
country cannot receive (give) transfers from (to) the agriculture sector of the same
country. Since the manufacturing sector in Country 1 insists on the level of tariﬀ
m in order to satisfy the participation constraint without transfers, and since the
agricultural sector of Country 2 insists on the level of tariﬀ a for the same reason,
there is no way for the ITO to intervene. In this case international facility to transfer
income between countries is of no avail. The required flows of transfers depicted in
Figure 4A will not materialize.
If we consider, somewhat implausibly, that domestic transfers across sectors are
blocked, but domestic transfers to and from governments and international transfers
are free, it is still possible to attain the first best solution (as shown in Figure 4B).
A sector that gains from trade liberalization could transfer to its own government,
the government could transfer either directly to the other government (or indirectly
through ITO) under the assumption of international transferability, and finally the
other government can transfer to the sector that would suﬀer from lower tariﬀ in the
absence of transfer. More concretely, the manufacturing sector in Country 1 cannot
pay its own agricultural sector, but it can contribute funds to the government of
Country 1 and, through the government of Country 2, influence the manufactured
good tariﬀ in Country 2. By this device one can attain the first best solution. 3
Proposition III:
3

This raises the possibility of cross-national lobbying of the government in one country by the
sectors of another country. See M. Endoh (2005).
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If cross-sector transfers of funds are blocked within each country, then there is
no possibility of improvement by the intervention of the ITO. Under a less plausible
assumption of free transfers of funds to a sector in the other countries, the ITO can
still achieve the best outcome.

2

A Simple Derivation of the Cost of Transfer

Our model departs from the standard common agency literature and from the trade
war literature in an important way, and analyzes the diﬃculty of income transfers.
We explicitly consider in this section the cost of transfers among pressure groups
and among countries. We present a simple justification for the claim that transfers
involve additional costs. We focus on the political-economy element, among many
other reasons, to evaluate the cost or the dead-weight loss incurred in the transfer
process. We base our arguments on the common observation that the government
cannot know the magnitude of losses and gains to various parties (and ITO cannot
know of the losses and gains to various member countries). Informational features
were implicitly treated in Dixit and Londregan (1995), but their implications were
not fully exploited because they were combined with many other features of their
model. We extract a single factor concerning the asymmetry of information between
individual constituencies and the central authority or politicians in their model and
develop it into the cornerstone of our formulation. In this setting the central authority
(or politicians) have limited information on the economic state of each member of the
constituency, in contrast to the assumption in Coate and Morris (1995) that members
of constituency have only limited knowledge of the politician’s intentions.
It is natural to assume that each group within a country consists of many individual economic agents. Even in international organizations, the number of nations can
be in scores if not hundreds. Therefore, we may reasonably assume that the national
government (or the international organization) does not know the magnitude of the
loss from trade negotiation incurred by each individual member of a pressure group
(or each nation). Neither does the government (or the international organization)
know the magnitude of the gain to each individual of a pressure group (or a nation).
By assuming such asymmetry of information between government and constituents
who will receive or pay a part of the lump-sum transfer, we obtain the following
seldom-noticed results.
Let us start from a simple example illustrated in Figure 5. Suppose there are
three manufacturers in the (developing) Country 1. Suppose under the negotiated
deal price drops from Pmo → Pm1 and supply quantity drops from 3 unit to 0 unit.
The total loss of surplus to the industry is the sum of loss to each manufacturer:
X = (Pm0 A1 GH) + (A1 A2 EF ) + (A2 A3 BC).

(18)

How does the government divide X among the three manufacturers if it does not have
10

their private information on cost or the shape of private supply functions? Consider
two possibilities:
(1) Fix the price of manufactured goods at Pm0 and restore the status before the
reduction of tariﬀs. Consequences include price administration cost, black market and
loss of opportunities to reallocate resources away from manufacturing. No producer
is put out of business.
(2) Raise a compensation fund for the sector and distribute it among the manufacturers in proportion to their pre-intervention production that is equal to amount
Pm0 S. Consequences of this solution include unhappy Producers 1 and 2 because they
are made worse oﬀ, and a happy Producer 3 (gets more than his loss through the
transfer). In an election, the government would be voted out 2 to 1, if manufacturers
are its only constituency.
One can repeat the same exercise for consumers who gain from the tariﬀ reduction.
Additional complications arise because each consumer is not necessarily sensitive to
small per capita changes in taxes and subsidies.
This point is reinforced by studying the case where the supply curve of an import
competing industry is linear. In our example, the developing Country 1 has two
sectors, agriculture and manufacture. Initially, suppose that the manufactured good
is protected at the tariﬀ rate m which is optimum for the sector. In Figure 6A, under
the tariﬀ rate m, the price is p0m and the manufacturers in this country enjoy the
producers’ surplus Pm0 CN. Suppose by agreement, the tariﬀ rate on manufactured
goods is reduced, and the price level drops to p1m < p0m . Then the producer surplus
is reduced to area Pm1 AN. The loss to the producer of manufactures in Country 1 is
the area of echelon Pm0 Pm1 AC.
On the other hand, suppose Country 1 gains from the tariﬀ reduction for the
agricultural good in the industrialized Country 2. Accordingly, assume that the price
of the agricultural good increases from p0a to p1a ( p0a < p1a ).Then, in Figure 6B, the
producers’ surplus will be increased from area Pa0 MA in Figure 6B to area Pa1 MC .
The gain to the export of agriculture good in Country 1 is thus the area of echelon
Pa0 Pa1 A C .
The conventional argument is that transfers resolve the distributional conflict
between the agriculture and the manufacturing sectors as long as the echelon of gain
Pa0 Pa1 A C in Figure 6B is larger than the echelon of loss Pm0 Pm1 AC. We claim in this
paper, considering the political-economy of transfers under asymmetric information,
the government must spend considerably more than the echelon Pm0 Pm1 AC, while it
is able to collect much less than echelon Pa0 Pa1 A C .
Let us assume for simplicity that the government is a common agency that is motivated by the contributions that reveal true costs to groups, but that the incumbent
government is determined by the majority voting rule. Then, evenly dividing the
total subsidy of Pm0 Pm1 AC among the members of the suﬀering manufacturing industry will leave some individuals in this industry with a net loss. If the industry casts
votes to elect the incumbent government, the government must spend as lump-sum
11

subsidies more than the amount of Pm0 Pm1 AC. In other words, if the government gives
subsidies of HPm0 per unit in Figure 6A, then the voters along OV in the horizontal
axis will be still dissatisfied in spite of the government having spent HPm0 CD in subsidies. In order to secure the support of all members of the industry, the government
will have to increase its subsidy to the amount of tariﬀ (Pm0 − Pm1 ), and spend a total
of Pm0 Pm1 EC, an amount that exceeds the total industry loss by the area of triangle
CAE. This will leave the government to finance trade liberalization with a deficit of
CAE which will end up in the pockets of the marginal manufacturers AE.
Similarly, in Figure 6B, if the government imposes a uniform tax on the members
of the A industry to raise the total amount Pa0 Pa1 A C by taxing Pa1 G, again farmers
belonging to W W will be dissatisfied. To secure the votes of all the farmers, the tax
will have to be reduced to zero and nothing can be collected.
Conventional explanations for the diﬃculty of transfer include self-interst, asymmetry of information about the reliability of the intermediary of transfer process. For
example, politicians may not be trusted to transfer funds honestly (Coate and Morris,
1995). We add to these conventional explanations a third argument: the asymmetric
information about the individual gains and losses to participants. Note the following
features related to information asymmetry and the cost of transfers.
First, the loss from transferring income will be greatest when the recipient industry
ceases to produce, and, similarly, when the compensating industry begins to produce.
The loss triangle C (e.g. CAE in Figure 6A) will be the largest. A corollary to this
is the fact that the same amount of tariﬀ reduction will incur a smaller deadweight
loss due to asymmetry of information if it is processed in two or more steps. Gradual
tariﬀ reduction can be less costly.
Second, when the incumbent government is strong and stable, this type of transfer
cost can be small because the government can aﬀord to lose votes in particular sectors.
Government can give just enough subsidy (or gather just enough tax) so the net eﬀect
of liberalization will leave the majority to support the action. When the incumbent
government is politically weak, it would be diﬃcult for the government to yield tariﬀ
concessions.
We may summarize our findings as
Proposition IV:
When the government does not know the consequences of trade liberalization for
individual constituents, the amount it can collect is smaller and the amount it must
pay is larger than would be under symmetric information. Further, the magnitude of
liberalization increases this gap and destabilizes political support for government.
In addition, one can prove the following
Proposition V:
If the supply curve (or the demand curve) is linear, more than half of the producers (consumers) will be dissatisfied with the transfer of the average loss per unit of
production (consumption).
In Figure 7A, suppose that the initial price level is Pm0 and it was reduced to Pm1
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such that the supply quantity is reduced by proportion θ. That is, the supply was
reduced from unity (OV is normalized to 1) to (1 − θ). Denote the slope of the linear
supply curve as 1/b so that Pm0 Pm1 = bθ and Pm1 N = b(1−θ). Accordingly, distributing
transfers by averaging out the burden of the total area of echelon Pm0 Pm1 AC so that
every producer receives Pm0 H will leave the producers of OV dissatisfied. (It is easy
to see that in order to cancel the two shaded areas, CD = 12 bθ(2 − θ), UV = UV −
V V = θ − 12 θ(2 − θ).) Therefore, the proportion of dissatisfied producers is OV =
OU + UV = (1− θ) +θ − 12 θ(2−θ) = 12 + 12 (1− θ)2 ≥ 12 . The proportion of dissatisfied
producers approaches 100 percent as the magnitude of tariﬀ cut approaches zero.
Of course, this result is due to the linearity assumption of the supply curve. Figure
7B illustrates two cases. In case (a) only a small proportion of producers are properly
compensated and the government loses the support of the majority. In case (b) only
a small proportion of producers suﬀer while the others receive compensation in excess
of their losses, and the government retains popular support.4
The abovementioned diﬃculty of making transfers applies to domestic as well as
to international contexts. Given the problem of identifying the cost structures across
countries it is hardly surprising that the incidence of international transfers is limited.
This can be seen by comparing the magnitude of international transfers such as foreign
aid relative to GDP, with the magnitude of money involved in domestic transfers, such
as social security, food stamps, medicaid, and the Small Business Administration. It
is reasonable to assume that the capability of international institutions to redistribute
income is quite limited. In spite of Proposition I above, even the governments that
take account of the full benefits and costs to consumers will find it diﬃcult to achieve
the Pareto eﬃcient resource allocation in the presence of costly transfers.
Some readers may wonder why our theory is built on the simple Hayekian observation that the information in the economy is dispersed and that the benefit of
a consumer or the cost of a producer is not known to others. We regard this as a
strength rather than a weakness. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) built their theory of
insurance on the assumption of information asymmetry; we use the same assumption
to build a theory of transfers. The simpler the logic, the more transparent and potentially persuasive could the theory be. Diﬃculties of assessing benefits and costs lie
at the heart of many important economic and legal problems. Formidable amounts
of resources and human energy are spent on the verification of costs which are not
4

The size of budgetary subsidy necessary to retain a majority support for liberalization depends
on the actual shape of the supply function. The hypothetical assumption that politicians have to
retain the support of a majority in this particular industry is used here to help understand the issue.
As an illustrative example, consider supply curves (a) and (b) in Figure 7C. Let Ma and Mb be the
points on the respective supply curves corresponding to quantity S/2 − ε where ε is small. With
3
supply (a), per unit subsidy of P0 Ra = QRa should satisfy the majority, although the total subsidy
3
will exceed the total losses of the producers by area QMa Ra (shaded by horizontal lines). Similarly,
with supply (b), a per unit subsidy of P0 Rb should satisfy the majority, though the total subsidy
3
will exceed the total losses of the producers by area QMb Ra (shaded by diagonal lines). The excess
amount paid to producers is small with supply (b), but it is always non-negative.
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common knowledge in the legislation as well as in disputes on predatory pricing and
anti-dumping cases. If the verification issues discussed in this paper were easy to
resolve, there would be only a few disputes on domestic predatory pricing or international dumping. Antidumping legislation and disputes suggest that establishing
consensus on cost structure across sectors and across countries cannot be taken for
granted.

3

The Eﬀect of the Diﬃculty of Transfers on International Negotiation

3.1

(i) Diﬃculties in the transfers across countries.

Let us begin with the need for, as well as the diﬃculty of, international transfers. If
the optimal reactions expressed by equations (7) and (8) above satisfy the individual
rationality conditions, individuals will participate without any transfers. Even if the
participation constraints are violated, as long as the transfer payments can be made
without any additional costs, reforms can be supported by the appropriate transfers.
When the optimal reactions do not satisfy the participation constraints, the cost of
transfers will aﬀect the outcome of the common agency problem.
Suppose that international transfers require a fraction β ∗ (0 < β ∗ < 1) of additional resource as transaction cost. β ∗ Y evaporates in the process of transferring Y .
We have explained the reason for this cost in Section 2.
Suppose that inequality (7) is violated and the developing Country 1 needs to
receive the transfer payments. By construction both countries cannot simultaneously
require transfer payments. The ITO must minimize the following cost that includes
the transaction cost:
Γ = [(Tm − m)2 + γTa2 ] + [γTm2 + (Ta − a)2 ] + β ∗ C21 + β ∗ C12

(19)

where C21 = {[(Tm − m)2 + γTa2 ] − γa2 } if {[(Tm − m)2 + γTa2 ] − γa2 } ≥ 0, and
= 0, otherwise.
C12 = {[γ(Tm − m)2 + Ta2 ] − γm2 } if {[γ(Tm − m)2 + Ta2 ] − γm2 } ≥ 0, and
= 0, otherwise.
Note that C21 and C12 can both be zero, in which case the internal minimization
of (3) does not interfere with the participation constraints, and the standard analysis
without consideration of transfer costs remains valid (cf. Figure 2A). C21 and C12
cannot both be simultaneously positive. Because the total cost without transfer costs
is already minimized over the initial conditions, at least one party is better oﬀ after
14

the ITO intervention and without transfers. An interesting case is when either C21 or
C12 is non-negative.
Let us start with the case when C21 is positive, and the developing country needs
to receive transfers. Then the ITO determines Tm and Ta in such a way as to minimize
Γ = [(Tm − m)2 + γTa2 ] + [γTm2 + (Ta − a)2 ] + β ∗ {[(Tm − m)2 + γTa2 ] − γa2 }. (20)
Minimization is achieved when
Tm =

1 + β∗
1
a.
∗ m, and Ta =
1+γ+β
1 + γ + β∗γ

(21)

As β ∗ approaches unity and international transfers become more diﬃcult, Ta is
left at a value a little lower than a, and Tm is left at a value a little higher than m.
The ITO can do little to promote freer trade. In Figure 8, the iso-utility curves of
Countries 1 and 2 are drawn as ellipses centered on (m, 0) and (0, a) respectively.
Assuming that the initial position is (m, a), both the isoquants pass through (m, a).
The ITO chooses a point C in the absence of transfer costs. In our formulation, C1
is on the line connecting the origin to (m, a). In Figure 8, point C corresponds to
equation (4) without the need for transfers. E is a point that needs transfers, taking
into account the opportunity cost of moving from C and the cost of transfers. As in
the case of Proposition II, (21) lies on the contract curve.5
Proposition VI:
When international transfers are costly, and the ratio of a and m is far from
unity, the ITO will stop short of minimizing the joint loss. Compared to the case of
costless transfers, ITO will set a higher upper tariﬀ limit on imports to the country
under a binding participation condition (i.e. the recipient of transfers). The upper
limit on imports to the other country (i.e. the donor of transfers) will be lower than
the case corresponding to costless transfers.

3.2

(ii) Diﬃculties in transfers across sectors within countries.

Diﬃculties in transferring income from one interest group to another within a country
create problems similar to those associated with transferring income from one country
to another. Suppose the manufacturing sector in Country 1 and the agriculture sector
in Country 2 are the two groups that are aﬀected unfavorably by the ITO decisions.
Our analysis of information asymmetry in the process of transfers extends to the
reason for dead weight loss associated with transfers.
5

In its simplest formulation, the Nash bargaining solution falls on the contract curve that is
located on the 45 degree line from (m, a) with the assumption γ 12 = γ 21 = γ within the no-transfer
required zone, and there is no problem of transfers. Of course, the Nash Bargaining Solution does
not necessarily maximize the sum of benefits and is dominated in most cases by the common agency
solution when transfers are costless.

15

Assume that fraction β 1 of the transfer within Country 1 and fraction β 2 of the
transfer within Country 2 are needed as additional resources to keep the balance in
political economy. The conditional non-linear programming can be reduced to a fairly
simple problem of minimizing the cost. For example, if manufacturers in Country 1
and farmers in Country 2 are to be compensated by transfers, the ITO will end up
choosing Tm and Ta to minimize
Γ = [(Tm − m)2 + γTa2 ] + [γTm2 + (Ta − a)2 ] + β 1 (Tm − m)2 + β 2 (Ta − a)2 ,

(22)

which gives the optimal solutions for the ITO:
Tm =

1 + β1
1 + β2
m, and Ta =
a.
1 + γ + β1
1 + γ + β2

(23)

The degree of resistance to reduce tariﬀs is related to the diﬃculty of transfers
within a country. Then one can state
Proposition VII:
Cost of transfers across sectors of a country raises the upper limits of Tm and Ta .
The greater the diﬃculty of transfer to a certain sector, closer does the tariﬀ of the
sector remain to the initial (optimal to the sector) tariﬀ level.
One could interpret this as an example of the generalized nature of the two-level
game (Putnam, 1998). When it is more diﬃcult to make structural adjustments
(transfers) in a country, it can retain a higher tariﬀ on import and exploit the other
country. Not surprisingly, in international negations, every government has incentives
to exaggerate its domestic hurdles and opposition to liberalization.

3.3

When Both International and Domestic Transfers are
costly

Instead of going into the general formulation, let us illustrate by an example the
minimization problem of taking into account both the cost of domestic transfer and
the cost of international transfer. The ITO’s choice of tariﬀ bounds must overcome
the diﬃculties in international as well as domestic transfers. Country 1 needs to
receive international transfers (with iceberg cost ratio β ∗ ), the manufacturing sector in
Country 1 needs to receive domestic transfers (with cost ratio β 1 ) from its agricultural
sector, and the agricultural sector in Country 2 needs to receive domestic transfers
from its manufacturing sector (with iceberg cost ratio β 2 ). Then the optimal upper
limits of tariﬀs that the ITO imposes will become:
1 + β1 + β∗
1 + β2
a
Tm =
∗ m, and Ta =
1 + γ + β1 + β
1 + γ + β2 + β∗γ
Interpretations of these results are similar to those in previous sections.
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(24)

4

Concluding Remarks

Using partial equilibrium analysis, we attempt to extend the logic of common agency
to international institutions. We find that an analysis of mechanisms for implementing
transfer payments is essential for understanding the functioning of an international
organization. Such analylsis is critical if we consider the individual rationality constraint. The cost involved in making transfers can be derived in a simple setting
where the government does not know the gains and losses to individual constituents
caused by its trade or other policy decisions.
Our trade model of tariﬀ determination is simplified in the number of sectors as
well as the availability of policy instruments, and depends on the partial equilibrium
framework. Simplicity, however, allows us to demonstrate the basic logic associated
with transfers in the model of an international agency. Satisfaction of participation
constraints are closely related to the diﬃculty of making transfers. The interaction
between the transfer possibilities across nations and those within a nation presents
many interesting issues.6 Saijo and Yamoto (1999) open a new dimension in the
analysis of international negotiations by considering the relationship between incentive compatibility of supplying public goods and participation constraints, although
it is yet to be seen how our approach might be related to each other.
The possible eﬀect of improving the incentives under information asymmetry is
studied by Karla Hoﬀ (1994), and Hoﬀ and Andrew Lyon (1995). They are among
the few who carefully deal with the interaction between redistribution theory and
information asymmetry. They show that even eﬃciency distorting transfers may enhance the production eﬃciency by alleviating the incentive compatibility constraint.
We do not deny those positive aspects of transfers. The main message of this paper is, however, that under asymmetric information a transfer itself may impose on
us, through the political-economy process, a substantial burden in addition to the
amount of the intended transfer. To borrow the metaphor from Hoﬀ and Lyon, the
bucket may not be leaking but deciding exactly where to drip is a problem.
Several policy issues arise from our analysis. The reason for the possible impasse in
an international negotiation can be analyzed by considering the ease or the diﬃculty
of transferring income in developing countries. Even if the total pie is larger under a
free trade regime administered by an international institution like the WTO, many
developing countries may be frustrated if they do not get an adequate share of the
pie. In the analysis of these matters, one has to take into account the public good
benefit of creating common trade rules. The participation of countries creates a kind
of public goods that are not considered in this paper. If we consider this public
good nature of participation, we can understand why the threat of exit by a group of
6

The similar properties will be generalized, we conjecture, to a general equilibrium model of
trade talks. Grossman and Helpman (1995), for example, analyse the case where a combination of
tariﬀ-rate movements can achieve the same eﬀects as transfers do.

17

countries can be eﬀective.7
By the same token, the debate between Samuelson (2004) and Bhagwati-PanagariaSrinivasan (2004) is related to the situation where the total pie of the world economy
increases by technical progress in developing countries but the welfare of developed
countries is cut. If there is a will as well as a way to implement transfers from countries that gain to the losing countries, technical progress is always a blessing. It is
often hard to find the will to make contributions which are viewed as a matter of
charity. The main point of this paper is that implementing transfers is not as easy as
we often assume. Hamada and Sunder (2005) contrast attitudes of economists, who
are usually enthusiastic about the free trade doctrine, and politicians who are mostly
reluctant to accept the doctrine. They present evidence from laboratory experiments
on the diﬃculty of implementing potential Pareto improvements through voluntary
transfer payments.
The gains and losses to individual constituents are inherently private and cannot
be reliably communicated to others or to a central authority. Hayek (1945) emphatically pointed to this fundamental problem of dispersed information in society about
the time Hicks (1939) and Kaldor (1939) put forward their welfare criterion:
...the “data” from which the economic calculus starts are never for the
whole society “given” to a single mind which could work out the implications, and can never be so given.
The particular character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of
which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form,
but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The ecoomic
problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate “given”
resources—if “given” is taken to mean given to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem set by these “data.” It is rather a problem of
how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of
society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know.
Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge not
given to any one in its totality (pp. 519-520).
Markets can have the remarkable power of inducing individuals to reveal information which is private to them, as each of them pursues its self-interest under conflicting
motives to cooperate as well as compete, all at once. Hayek (1945) argued and Plott
and Sunder (1988) present evidence that under appropriate conditions, the sum of the
information in private hands can appear as knowledge common to all participants in
7

In the experience after the Cancun meeting of the WTO, for example, the formation of the
Group of 20 of middle-income countries led by Brazil, India and others seems to have worked as a
useful threat to open the agricultural market in advanced countries
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a market. In implementing a scheme of transfers, competitive motives may frustrate
the attempts to achieve the Hayekian miracle of information aggregation.
Without questioning the logic of advocating free trade or the logic of common
agency, we question the validity and consequences of assuming the automatic and
eﬀortless transfer payments among individuals, groups and nations. It is not our
intention to recommend that policy makers ignore distributional justice, or to oppose
transfer of wealth from the rich to the poor driven by humanitarian motives. We
only point out the plain fact that, under information asymmetry, it is diﬃcult and/or
costly to accomplish intended transfers. This will probably necessitate us to change
our views on the functioning of international organizations.
We hope that our analysis has shown the importance of studying transfer processes
in the international as well as the domestic economy in general. Rather than abstracting away from transfer issues by casually assuming the possibility of free transfers,
we need to explore the causes and the consequences of costly transfers. We need to
examine the intrinsic relationship between the diﬃculty of transfers and asymmetric
information.
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Figure 4B
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